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on the California Supreme Court
he late1980
Ottothrough
Kaus, who
from
1985,served
used a
marvelous metaphor to describe the
dilemma of deciding controversial
cases while facing reelection. He said it
was like finding a crocodile in your
bathtub when you go in to shave in the
morning. You know it's there, and you
try not to think about it, but it's hard to
think about much else while you're
shaving. (Uelmen, Otto Kaus and the
Crocodile, 30 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 971
(1997).) The crocodile, of course, is a
manifestation of the "public account-

striking down popular initiative measures. But the fattest crocodile of all is
the growing backlog of death penalty
cases clogging the dockets of 39 state
supreme courts. This is a crocodile with
a voracious appetite.
Justice Penny White of the
Tennessee Supreme Court discovered
that in 1996. She was appointed to the
Tennessee Supreme Court in January of
1995. She participated in one death
penalty decision, joining all the other
justices on her five-judge court in
reversing a death penalty judgment in
June of 1996. (State v. Odom, 928
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'es
a/
Crocodile
Why Elected Judges Can't Ignore

Public Opinion
ability" many states impose upon sitting judges. The justices of supreme
courts in 23 states face contested elections at some stage in their career.
Supreme court justices in another 15
states face retention elections to keep
their jobs. (N.Y Times, Jan.22, 1988, §
I, at 8). In recent years, many of these
justices have encountered more than
one crocodile in their bathtub. Abortion
remains a hot-button issue in many
states, and final resolution of federal
issues now clears the deck for state
constitutional issues to be presented for
the first time to many state supreme
courts. And in the 21 states that allow
legislation by popular initiative, justices
frequently encounter an accusation that
they are thwarting the voters' will by

S.W.2d 18 (Tenn. 1996).) By unhappy
coincidence, Justice White was the only
supreme court justice on the ballot two
months later. Governor Don Sundquist
saw an opportunity to gain another
Republican seat on the court. He
denounced Justice White as a judge
who was soft on the death penalty and
weak on victim's rights. His campaign
succeeded and she was removed from
office after winning only 44.8 percent
of the votes. As he contemplated
appointing her successor, Governor
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Sundquist chortled, "Should a judge look
over his shoulder about whether they're
going to be thrown out of office? I hope
so." (Com. Appeal (Memphis, Tenn.),
Aug. 3, 1996, at Al).)
In keeping with our crocodile
metaphor, we need to contemplate the
lesson taught by one of the greatest
philosophers ever to emerge from an
American swamp. I refer, of course, to
Pogo, the wise possum created by cartoonist Walt Kelly. Pogo was heard to
say, on a number of occasions, "We have
met the enemy and he is us." When he
said that, Pogo was frequently speaking
to his friend, Albert-an alligator, not a
crocodile, but close enough. The question for judges to contemplate is, how
can one serve the crocodile without
becoming its meal? Lawyers cannot simply shrug their shoulders and say to the
judges, "It's your problem." Obviously,
it is a problem for every citizen devoted
to the preservation of the rule of law.
Most especially, it is a problem that
demands a major commitment from the
organized bar. Too often, when a sitting
justice is challenged, the prosecutors line
up on one side, and the criminal defense
bar on the other. Rather than a fight over
judicial independence, the contest is perceived as a struggle to fill the bench with
judges who will favor the legal arguments "our side" advances. Let me take
you through the swamp. We may find
there are valuable lessons to be learned
from some of our encounters with crocodiles during the past 10 years.

A tour of the swamp
The American appetite for the death
penalty is best reflected in one, stark statistic. There are now more than 3,000 men and
women on death rows in America. At the
close of 1996, California led the parade with
420, Texas had 404, Florida was at 362, and
Pennsylvania was in fourth place with 196.
The supreme courts of these and other states
find the processing of death penalty appeals
and petitions for post conviction relief consumes a bigger slice of the docket each succeeding year. To get a quick estimate, I
counted up the total number of published
opinions produced by the supreme courts of
six death penalty states for 1985, and again
for 1995. 1 then ascertained what proportion

of these opinions were death penalty cases.
The six states selected were California,
Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Texas, and Virginia.
It's interesting that the total number of published opinions produced by these courts
actually declined 13.5 percent during the
10-year interval. Like the U.S. Supreme
Court, state supreme courts are becoming
more selective in filling their dockets, and

accounts for a disproportionate share of this
sample, going from an affirmnance rate of
zero in 19 8 5 to a rate of 94 percent in 1995,
the afftirmance rate in Texas went from 86
percent to 96 percent during the same 10year period. Although some of this increase
may be attributable to the law becoming
more settled, it can't be denied that some of
the increase is attributable to the presence
of a fat crocodile in the
bathtub. There are disturbing indications that
judicial reluctance to
Ity
reverse death penalty
judgments may sometimes be reluctance to
expose one's posterior
to the wrath of the
electorate.
In California, three
justices were removed from the state
supreme court in the purge of 1986. The
campaign that unseated them featured ads
promising that "no" votes against the retention of these three justices was the equivalent of three "yes" votes for the death
penalty. Apparently California set a standard for judicial politicking that has been
emulated beyond its borders. Supreme
court elections in at least 10 states have
been dominated by death penalty politicking in the past decade, and California and
Tennessee are not the only states to see incumbent justices removed. Two justices
were removed from the Mississippi
Supreme Court after two separate campaigns focusing on death penalty issues.
Justice James Robertson was defeated in
1992 after he was attacked for two dissenting opinions in death penalty affirmances.
Ironically, when both cases were reviewed
by the U.S. Supreme Court, the majority
agreed with Justice Robertson's dissents
and reversed the convictions. In 1990, Mississippi Supreme Court Justice Joel Blass
was defeated by an opponent promising to
be a "tough judge for tough times" who attacked the incumbent justice for being "soft
on crime" In both contested elections, the
challenger was endorsed by the Mississippi
Prosecutors Association. (Stephen B.
Bright and Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and
the Politics of Death:DecidingBetween
the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in
CapitalCases,75 B.U. L. Rev. 759,

Why should death per
cases be singled out for
review?

deciding fewer cases. But there is one portion of their docket that these courts have
little control over: the automatic appeals of
death penalty judgments. The number of
death penalty cases decided by these six
courts increased 31 percent between 1985
and 1995. In 1985, 5.5 percent of the published opinions produced by these six
courts were in death cases. In 1995, that
proportion increased to 8.3 percent. The
number of published opinions, of course, is
a rather crude measure of the proportion
of a state supreme court justice's workload
that is devoted to death penalty review.
Many justices in these states would agree
with the estimate of recently retired
California Chief Justice Malcolm Lucas,
who told me death cases are now 20-25
percent of the workload of the California
Supreme Court.
What may be most disconcerting about
the death penalty cases during the past 10
years, however, is the increase in the rate of
afinnance by some state supreme courts.
Ten years ago, these six supreme courts
affirmed 63 percent of the death penalty
judgments they reviewed. In 1995, 90
percent of the death penalty judgments reviewed were affirmed. Although California
Gerald E Uelmen is a professoroflaw at
California' Santa ClaraUniversity School
ofLaw.He was cocounselforthe defense
in the Los Angeles trialofPeople v. O.J.
Simpson.

763-64 (1995).)
In 1992, 1 published the results of a
study correlating death penalty affirmance
rates for all state supreme courts for the 10year period ending in 1987, including the
manner of judicial selection used for the
justices on those courts. [See sidebar Selection Statistics.]The 38 states that then had a
death penalty included those that appoint
their justices for life, as in the federal system; states that utilize uncontested retention elections, such as California and Arizona; states that permit contested but non
partisan elections, such as Georgia and Ilinois; states that require judges to run under
party labels, such as Texas and Mississippi;
and even a handful of states where justices
are elected by the legislature, such as Virginia and South Carolina. The results suggest that judges whose tenure is more secure are more willing to overturn a death
penalty judgment.

Can the swamp be drained?
In California, the crush of the death
penalty caseload engendered a proposal to
eliminate automatic direct review of all
death penalty cases by the state supreme
court. (Robert Weisberg, Redistributing the
Wealth of CapitalCases: ChangingDeath
Penalty Appeals in California,28 Santa
Clara L. Rev. 243 (1988).) That could also
dissipate the political pressure so intensely
focused upon the seven justices of the California Supreme Court by the volatile death
penalty issue. The automatic appeal of as
many as 46 new death judgments in one
year directly from the trial court to the
supreme court imposes burdens on the
court that could just as expeditiously be
handled by the intermediate courts of appeal, which have grown along with their
caseload, while the size of the supreme
court has remained constant for more than
a century. In some states, the direct appeal
of death judgments to the state supreme
court is an anomaly, established long before intermediate appellate courts even existed. Why should death penalty cases be
singled out for direct access to the supreme
court docket when all other cases must
compete for the court's limited resource of
final review?
The traditional answer, of course, is that
consistency in administering the ultimate
punishment demands final review by the
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
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same body of judges in every case. Actually, final review by the supreme court could
be preserved after initial review by an intermediate court. The supreme court would
still be spared sifing through all the preliminary procedural obstacles like appointment of counsel and certifying the record.
It is much easier to review a case that has
already been reviewed by a lower court.
Cases reversed by the lower court would
not even have to be heard. And even if final
supreme court review were discretionary,
the uniformity of ultimate judgment would
be preserved in the process of considering
applications for discretionary review.
Some resistance to this proposal comes,
as might be expected, from the judges of
the intermediate courts of appeal. They
have to face retention elections, too. Why
should they be saddled with the political
burden that supreme court justices must
currently bear, without any of the rewards?
The greatest opposition to this proposal,
however, comes from those who strongly
support the death penalty itself. They argue
that intermediate appellate review will drag
out the review process in capital cases even
longer than it currently takes. It is interesting to note that one of the few death penalty states that did have review of death
penalty appeals by intermediate appellate
courts prior to state supreme court review
abandoned the practice in 1994. The state
constitution of Ohio was amended by a
vote of the people in 1994, to eliminate review of death cases by intermediate appellate courts. Despite opposition from the
state bar and civil liberties organizations,
the measure was sold to the voters as a
means of speeding up the administration of
the death penalty. As a result, the Ohio
Supreme Court, whose justices are elected,
reviewed 17 death penalty cases in 1995,
compared to the three that were reviewed
in 1985. The measure has had no perceptible impact upon their rate of affirmance,
however. In both 1985 and 1995 it was 100
percent. Spreading the 'joy" of reviewing
'death penalty appeals among a wider population of appellate judges may be a promising refomi in terms of more efficiently
managing the workload of state supreme
court justices, but it would be a hard sell to
the public in today's climate of impatience

Spring 1998

with the delays between verdict and execution. Only Alabama continues to funnel
death cases through the intermediate court
of appeals, and legislation has been proposed to "speed up" death cases by ending
the practice there, too.

Solutions from the Sun Belt
Some have suggested that we look to
Texas for a solution. There, final review is
allocated between two courts, one for civil
cases and one for criminal cases. Thus,
death penalty cases can be efficiently reviewed without diverting the availability of
discretionary final review in civil cases.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals does
manage to review about 30 death penalty
cases each year. It has even been suggested
in California that a special rotating panel of
appellate justices be created just to handle
death penalty cases. Although that would
certainly alleviate the docket pressure that
death penalty cases create for the supreme
court, it would not address the problem of
political vulnerability for the justices assigned to sit on a special death penalty review panel. In Texas, the court of criminal
appeals reversed one
death penalty case in
1993. That was enough
to inspire a call for Republicans to take over
Fin
the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals in
Texas
1994. The voters responded to the call. Justice Charles Campbell, r
a former prosecutor
with 12 years on the bench, was removed.
Among those placed on the court was a
lawyer who had been admitted to the Texas
bar for two years and whose campaign
platform promised the death penalty for
killers, greater use of the harmless error
doctrine, and more sanctions for attomeys
who file frivolous appeals, "especially in
death penalty cases." (Bright & Keenan,
supra at 761). The affirmance rate for death
penalty appeals in Texas rose from 86 percent in 1985 to 96 percent in 1995.
The state that seems to have managed
the death penalty crocodile with greatest
success is the state that probably has the
largest indigenous population of crocodiles: Florida. The Florida Supreme Court
reviewed 50 death penalty judgments in

CRIMINAL JUSTICE
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1995, and chalked up a reversal rate of 52
percent, one of the highest reversal rates in
America. Is it because the justices of the
Florida Supreme Court are not subjected to
the political pressures prevalent in other
death penalty states? Hardly. Although
Florida utilizes a retention election system
in which justices face a yes/no confirmation vote every six years, recent years have
seen organized campaigns mounted to remove targeted justices with disturbing regularity. In 1990, then-Chief Justice Leander
Shaw, Jr., had to raise $300,000 for a campaign to retain his seat in the face of an organized campaign by anti-abortion forces
to remove him from office. And in 1992,
Justice Rosemary Barkett faced an organized campaign not only by anti abortion
forces, but by prosecutors and police unhappy that she joined in a dissenting opinion in one controversial death penalty case,
even though she had voted to affirm more
than 200 death penalty appeals during her
previous nine years on the court. While she
won retention with 60.9 percent of the vote,
the death penalty issue was trotted out in an
effort to defeat her 1994 appointment to the

al death case review in
is allocated between two
courts.

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circult and persuaded presidential candidate
Bob Dole to place her on the list of Clinton
appointees he labeled the judicial "hall
of shame:"
How is it that Florida has managed to
maintain an independent state supreme
court that rigorously reviews death penalty
cases, reversing between one-half and onethird of the cases it reviews every year?
One might speculate that Florida has defused public frustration by the delivery of
actual executions. Florida has successfully
executed 38 inmates since 1978 and the
Florida Supreme Court has maintained a
brisk pace of appellate review, deciding as

many as 73 death penalty appeals in a single year. Perhaps the public frustration so
frequently misdirected at courts is really
frustration with the total lack of executions
rather than with reversals in particular
cases. California in 1986 and Tennessee in
1996 had yet to see their death penalty law
ever enforced. It is not a solution, but one
reality that may have to be face d is that
this crocodile must be occasionally fed
with executions. And if he isn't, he will eat
his keepers.

The impact of judicial overrides
Attributing Florida's success to its delivery of executions, however, is hard to
reconcile with the fact that Texas has delivered 107 executions since 1978 and the
pace of review by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is close to that of Florida.
Why would such a fat, well-fed crocodile
turn on its keeper? It may simply be that
Texas crocodiles grow bigger and hungrier
than anywhere else and we shouldn't try to
learn anything from the Texas experience.
Two years ago, a young lawyer who
had experienced the Texas death penalty
system first-hand as a law clerk for the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and
as an attorney for the Texas Death Penalty
Resource Center, left Texas to join the capital litigation unit of the Florida State Public

addres changle,' wlith otll,
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Defender's Office in Miami. Writing for
The Texav Ltayer,Brent Newton offered
some interesting reflections on why the affirmance rate was so much higher in Texas
than in Florida. (Brent Newton, Capital
Punishment: Texas CouldLearn a Lot
From Florida,Tex. Law., Feb. 26, 1996, at
26). The most significant factor he identified was "the disparate quality of appellate
judges in the two states, which is largely a
function of the fact that judges on the Florida Supreme Court are not elected in partisan popular elections, as are the judges of
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals." He
also noted that the Florida Supreme Court
reviews the weighing of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances in the death
penalty detennination on appeal, while the
Texas court refuses to consider whether a
life sentence was more appropriate in view
of the mitigating circumstances. Many
death penalty reversals by the Florida
Supreme Court come in cases where ajury
actually recommended life imprisonment,
but the recommendation was overridden by
the trial judge.
The availability ofjudicial override has
yielded what Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
recently called "ostensibly surprising statistics?'(Harrisv.Alabama, 115 S.Ct. 1031,
1036 (1995).) Only four states allow judges
to disregard a jury's recommendation on
the death penalty and the same pattern has
emerged in all four states. In Alabama, trial
judges override jury recommendations of
life and impose a death sentence almost 10
times as frequently as they override recommendations of death. In Florida, trial
judges overrode jury recommendations in
185 cases between 1972 and 1992. In 134
of these, trial judges opted for death over a
life recommendation by the jury. In Indiana, the ratio was eight judicial overrides
for death to four for life between 1980
and 1994.
Why are trial judges more likely than
jurors to favor executions? Justice John
Paul Stephens put his finger on the problem in a dissenting opinion to the U.S.
Supreme Court ruling upholding the Alabama provisions for judicial override in death
penalty cases:
The "higher authority" to whom present-day capital judges may be "too responsive" is a political climate in which
judges who covet higher office--or

who merely wish to remain judgesmust constantly profess their fealty to
the death penalty. ... The danger that
they will bend to political pressures
when pronouncing sentence in highly
publicized capital cases is the same
danger confronted by judges beholden
to King George II.
(Harrisv. Alabama, supraat 1038, 1040
and n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Seen in this light, the high reversal rate
in Florida may to some extent be a corrective for the politicization of death penalty
decisions by judicial override in the trial
courts. Between 1980 and 1.991 the Florida
Supreme Court reviewed 90 death cases in
which ajury recommendation of a life sentence was overridden by a trial judge. In 69
of those cases-77 percent--the state
supreme court vacated the trial judge's sentence and either imposed a life sentence or
remanded for a new sentencing hearing.
(Lambrixv. Singletar, 117 S. Ct. 1517,
1534 n.8 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (1997).)
Although Florida Supreme Court justices
are also subject to the same political pressures, they are at least insulated by the device of yes/no retention elections, unlike
the contested elections faced by trial judges
in Florida and by judges of the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals. In the 1996 elections,
three justices of the Florida Supreme Court
were retained with no opposition.

The quality of appointed counsel
Judges who vote to affirm in every death
penalty case will be the first to loudly proclaim that the public pressure of electoral
politics is not a problem. No judge would
ever admit that his or her vote was influenced by public pressure or popular opinion. It takes a truly sensitive judge to even
engage in the soul-searching inquiry into
the impact of the crocodile in the bathtub
upon his or her decision-making process.
Since most death penalty trials involve
lengthy proceedings with complex evidentiary issues, there will be errors or failures
of counsel to be found in many of the
records reviewed. An affirmance is easily
rationalized by the harmless error rule or
a relaxed standard of competence for
lawyers. Opinions that affirtm are rarely
scrutinized or criticized by the press and
when they are, the criticism can be easily
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
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deflected or ignored by attributing it to
"liberals" who are opposed to the death
penalty.
Probably the most insidious influence of
the death penalty crocodile is its pervasive
impact upon the quality of counsel in death
cases. Judges who owe their elections to a
campan commitment to enforcing
the death penalty
will be more likely
to countenance
lazy and sloppy
lawyers. When one
compares the published opinions in
death penalty opinions issued by the
Florida Supreme
Court with those of
the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals,
one encounters a
profound difference in attitude regarding the degree
of competency to be demanded of courtappointed defense counsel. As Brent
Newton stuns it up in his Texas Law Review article:
Horror stories regarding Texas capital
defense lawyers--e.g., lawyers who engage in little or no preparation for trial,
lawyers who were drunk or fell asleep
at trial, openly racist lawyers representing minority clients--are legion. Unlike
the state and appellate courts in Florida,
appellate judges in Texas are generally
willing to turn a blind eye to such
shameful lawyering.
(Newton, supra at 26).
Regretfully, his observation of Texas courts
is occasionally applicable to California.
Too often, the lawyers who are criticized
by judges are not the lawyers who slept
through trials or did too little to prepare
their client's defense. Instead, judicial
wrath is visited upon the lawyers who do
"too much" for their clients, by vigorously
asserting every conceivable ground for reversal. Part of the problem with the review
of death penalty judgments by state
supreme courts today is that the siege mentality afflicting the justices leads them to reSpring 1998

gard the defense bar as "the enemy" In
California, the supreme court watched quietly as the governor dismantled the state
public defender's office and then trashed
the appellate project created to fill the void.
Largely as a result, more than 140 of the
occupants of California's death row are not

yet represented by appellate counsel. A recent study by the Texas Bar Foundation
concludes that Texas also faces a crisis in
providing competent counsel for death
penalty appeals and post conviction proceedings. (A Study of Representationin
CapitalCases in Texas, 56 Tex. B.J. 333
(1993). The establishment of public defender offices has been fiercely resisted in
Texas, while the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals still debates whether Gideon v.
Wainwright was correctly decided. (See Ex
ParteJordan, 879 S.W.2d 61,63-64 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1994) (en banc) (McCormick,
J., dissenting) (criticizing the U.S. Supreme
Court for interfering with Texas sovereignty by mandating counsel for indigents.)
The organized bar should be the loudest
defender of judicial independence. When
special interest groups or "victim's rights"
organizations suggest that their unhappiness with a particular decision should result
in removal of the judges who rendered it,
the judges are hardly in a position to respond with a spirited defense ofjudicial integrity and independence. Too often, the response is simply silence, which reinforces
the impression that judicial elections can
become referendums on the popularity of

CRIMINAL JUSTICE

HeinOnline -- 13 Crim. Just. 9 1998-1999

particular decisions. When that agenda is
endorsed by elected political leaders at the
highest level, courts are left in a highly vulnerable position that truly threatens the
principle of judicial independence. Yet,
when it is appropriate for a court to speak
out in defense of the principle that indigent
death row inmates
should be competently represented,
the judicial silence
is often deafening.
Last October,
when Congress
defunded the 20
death penalty resource centers
that were engaged
in raising the level
of competence of
defense lawyers
in death cases,
how many state
supreme courts
did Congress
hear from?

Three-crocodile states:
Ohio and Kentucky
If the past 10 years is any indication, the
states where judicial independence is most
gravely at risk are the states that feature
growing death rows without any executions, states in which abortion is a divisive
political issue, and states that allow statutory enactments or constitutional amendments by initiative. It might be said to justices in these states, 'Three crocodiles and
you're out:'
Indeed, there are two such states, Ohio
and Kentucky, and both subject their
supreme court justices to contested elections. Both states experience highly partisan and expensive races for supreme court
seats on a recurring basis. Ohio experienced one of the costliest judicial elections
in American history in 1986, when incumbent Chief Justice Frank Celebrezze spent
$1.7 million in an effort to keep his seat,
only to lose to Thomas Moyer, who spent
$1 million. The newly elected chief justice
voted to rehear 30 cases that had been decided in the final weeks of his predecessor's term. After news reports disclosed
that he had received campaign contributions from lawyers in five of those cases,

he disqualified himself from the hearings.
In response to a subsequent "reform"
movement, the supreme court itself imposed spending limits on Ohio judicial
election campaigns. Candidates for associate justice were limited to campaign expenditures of $350,000. A federal district court
judge held the spending limits unconstitutional and an appeal is now pending before
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. (Ohio Supreme CourtAppeals Ruling
in JudicialSpending Limits Case, Pol. Fin.
& Lobby Rep., Nov. 27, 1996 at 6.) Meanwhile, more than $1.75 million was spent
on races for two seats on the Ohio Supreme
Court in 1996. Although candidates stayed
within the court-imposed limits, independent groups pumped massive amounts of
money into media campaigns. The Ohio
Republican patty invested $305,000 on one

campaign, while a coalition of labor unions
and plaintiffs' lawyers spent $234,000 in
the opposing campaign. Ohio judicial campaigns tend to line up on traditional political party lines. Issues such as the death
penalty have not played a prominent role,
even though Ohio has not had an execution
since 1961 and 169 inmates are waiting on
Ohio's death row. The Ohio Supreme
Court for many years had the advantage of
intermediate appellate courts reviewing
death judgments, so most reversals occurred at the lower court level. Since 1994,
the state supreme court has reversed one
death judgment.
Kentucky has also been regularly setting and breaking records for campaign expenditures in recent judicial elections. In a
1996 contest, an incumbent justice raised
$625,000, including $520,000 from his
own pocket. He was defeated by a challenger who raised and spent $150,000.
Kentucky has 29 individuals on death row
and has not had an execution since 1962.
After the state supreme court reversed a
death judgment in 1983, 2,000 citizens of
Powell County, where the defendant had
been convicted, signed petitions calling for
the removal of the chief justice. Shortly
thereafter, Powell County was removed
from the judicial district where the chief
justice had to stand for reelection. Only two
death judgments have been reversed by the
Kentucky Supreme Court since then.

Living with crocodiles
One of my favorite Pogo adventures
was the crisis he encountered when asked
by a friendly momma frog to baby-sit her
tadpole. The tadpole was swimming in a
mason jar that Albert "mistook" for a martini with an olive. Pogo was ready to climb
down Albert's throat to retrieve the victim,
but was dissuaded when Albert insisted on
a farewell handshake. Pogo then came up
with a brilliant solution: He made Albert
drink so much water that the tadpole was
able to swim back out to Pogo's arms.
Pogo then declares that the solution is "not
so hard once we puts our minds to it.'
Once we 'puts our minds to it," the
problem of preserving judicial independence in an era ofjudicial politicization becomes a question of political will. Do those

who value the independence of the judiciary have the will to fight for it in the political
arena? Do they value it enough to put it
ahead of their political agenda of gaining
"control" of a court for a political party or a
special interest? Do they value it enough to
finance the campaigns that will have to be
mounted on behalf of judges who are targeted for defeat because of the unpopularity of their decisions?
The answers to these questions are by
no means obvious. We cannot assume that
all lawyers, or even all judges, are strongly
committed to the principle of judicial independence. We have recently witnessed the
spectacle of candidates for the presidency
of the United States and the governorship
of our largest states calling for the resignation or defeat of judges because they didn't
like the decisions they rendered. It might be
appropriate to demand that these politicians
drink lots of water from a mason jar!
If lawyers, who should know better, are
more committed to gaining personal political advantage than to preserving the principle of judicial independence, how will we
ever convince the electorate it should look
beyond the disagreements with a particular
decision?
Ultimately, the preservation of judicial
independence in America will depend upon
the commitment of American lawyers to
the cause. If lawyers utilize contested judicial elections as an opportunity to choose
up sides and promote the candidates whom
they believe will best serve the narrow interests of their clients, while removing
those who participated in decisions that did
not serve those interests, we will get the
judiciary we deserve. Unfortunately, the
most active bar associations in judicial
contests are the special interest bars that
seem more committed to the principle that
their side should win than they do to the
principle of judicial independence. As
Pogo so aptly put it, "We have met the
enemy and he is us:'
This articlewas adaptedfrom a presentation(72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1133
(1997)) to the 1997MidyearMeeting of the
Conference of ChiefJustices. 0
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